The South American Defense Council and the Region’s Political Process

 
 •	Applying collective security (through the CSD) in Latin America
• Hopes and challenges for UNASUR and the CSD
• Learning from the OAS and the IADB/C
• The inter-American system and security issues
• Bolivia, UNASUR's trial of fire
 The most ambitious and significant recent project undertaken by South
 America's armed forces has been the creation of Conselho Sul-Americano
 de Defesa (South American Defense Council – CSD), an agency of the
 Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).
 The success of this agency, part of the larger organization which is
 also in its infancy, is yet to be measured. To gauge the feasibility of
 such an ambitious project, it must be viewed in an appropriate context,
 perhaps as South America's version of a NATO-style organism (even if
 somewhat different and adapted to accept regional realities). UNASUR
 and CSD's future will be determined by whether they can become
 effective catalysts for regional security integration, and if member
 states can find a relevant role for them – perhaps in the area of
 peacekeeping. For the CSD to be a success, it first will have to deal
 with the region's troubling, if not mediocre, historical record
 regarding security and peacekeeping issues.
Learning from Mistakes: The OAS and the IADB
 Ambassador Robert White, president of the Center for International
 Policy, explained that the inter-American system got a promising start
 at the 1948 meeting in Bogota which founded the Organization of
 American States (OAS), which succeeded the Pan-American Union. However,
 the birth of a new inter-American system as it was originally conceived
 came crashing down with the 1954 CIA-sponsored coup in Guatemala. White
 then explains that "the crisis triggered by Arbenz's purchase of
 Eastern European weaponry could have been solved by an OAS commission
 putting pressure on the Guatemalan leader. This approach was supported
 by the U.S. State Department, but the Defense Department and the CIA
 have always preferred a unilateral approach and took matters into their
 own hands… in effect, that was the end of the inter-American system."
 The OAS generally has paid lip-service to U.S. interventions and
 unilateral decisions in the region. For example, Wayne Smith, director
 of the Cuba program at the Center for International Policy, explained
 that he could not recall any OAS protests during the U.S.-backed Bay of
 Pigs invasion in 1961. The OAS was almost mute during the American
 military interventions in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in
 1983 and Panama in 1989. Meanwhile, Cuba's membership in the OAS was
 suspended during the 1962 missile crisis.
 Throughout its existence, the OAS traditionally has suffered from
 being regarded as a Washington-dominated institution, suffering from a
 severe lack of qualified personnel and adequate economic resources.
 Although OAS agencies like the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO)
 carry out some important work, in general terms the OAS is viewed by
 those who know it best as a bureaucratic tangle at the lowest common
 denominator, with little to no relevancy. Latin governments usually
 regard it as a destination for diplomats on the verge of retirement,
 troublemakers and politicians that the government of the day wants out
 of the country. The two-term, all but frivolous, stint of former
 Colombian President Cesar Gaviria as OAS Secretary General in the 1990s
 helped cement this perception.
 The OAS advisory security agency, the Inter American Defense Board
 and College (IADB), is similarly regarded as largely irrelevant, akin
 in the minds off many as being little more than a militarized Moose
 Club. The IAD-Board was created during the Third Meeting of
 Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, January
 1942. The IAD-College opened in Fort Lesley McNair, in downtown D.C.,
 on October 1962. The agency deploys occasional humanitarian
 interventions in Central America and serves as a low-level
 confidence-building institution, bringing high-ranking military
 officers from Latin America together to work in a Washington D.C.
 mansion, or to carry out studies at Fort McNair. For most military
 officials, their time at the IADB is regarded as a highly desired
 year-long vacation in the U.S., which includes being able to bring
 their families along. Two distinguished alumni of the IAD-College are
 Chile's current President Michelle Bachelet and Ecuador's former
 leader, Lucio Guiterrez.
UNASUR and the CSD: A New Hope?
 It is perhaps due to this indifferent track record and as a reaction to
 the OAS' multiple strike outs that UNASUR has emerged as a new option
 for Latin American political integration. Of course, UNASUR is only the
 newest of a series of regional organizations attempting, broadly
 speaking, to emulate the European Union. However, it appears that Latin
 America's drive for integration and supranationalism may more closely
 approximate the working style of the African Union. Besides the OAS,
 other regional organizations active at the present time include the
 Andean Community, Mercosur, the Rio Group, the Venezuela-led ALBA, the
 Andean Parliament, the Caribbean Community for Caribbean Nations, not
 to mention extra-hemispheric organizations whose membership includes,
 in some cases, the European Union and in others, Spain & Portugal
 (SEGIB) or India and South Africa (IBSA). UNASUR was established as a
 result of the Cuzco Declaration, signed in 2004. Due to the nature of
 its present membership, it can be loosely regarded as the union of
 MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, plus Suriname and Guyana. Panama and
 Mexico both currently hold observer status. An April 2007 summit at
 Margarita Island, Venezuela, effectively created the organization.
 UNASUR's secretariat is to be based in Quito, Ecuador.
 One could suspect that a bona fide South American supranationalist
 would be tempted to dream that UNASUR and the CSD might become for
 South America what the OAS and the IADB were never able to be. For
 some, logic dictates that without the long shadow of U.S. membership,
 UNASUR might be able to promote integration through economic and
 political means, while the CSD would be primarily aimed at promoting
 security and confidence measures to cope with the ongoing arms race
 that has gripped South America with increased intensity for almost a
 decade. Apart from the attention Venezuela has gained in recent years
 over its major purchases of mostly Russian military technology and
 weaponry, other countries that are following the path of a military
 buildup include Brazil (led by its ambitious plans to build a
 nuclear-powered submarine) and Chile (which has purchased Humvees, F-16
 fighter planes and Leopard tanks).
 However, speculation has already arisen over what UNASUR and the CSD
 will be dealing with if these new institutions mean to become effective
 players in regional affairs. Some of the problems both bodies will have
 to tackle if they are to be considered relevant include:
- How does UNASUR differentiate itself from other regional agencies, besides in its membership?
- Will the absence of the U.S. propel the new organization on a dynamic path of growth and increasing authority?
-  What will be the catalyst that will bring countries together? Will
 UNASUR focus itself on trade, perhaps creating a UNASUR-free trade area?
- What will its bureaucracy be like? Will it resemble the European Union? Will a UNASUR Parliament and Secretariat be set up?
-  How much decision-making will South American nations be willing to
 give up to an overarching organization like UNASUR? This was one of the
 OAS' principle problems and an issue that the EU has had to grapple
 with since its founding – the factor of supranationalism. Namely, would
 any South American government be persuaded to abide by an order issued
 by UNASUR's Secretary General? Or will this organization merely be a
 forum for discussion and consensus-seeking (which would quickly render
 it practically irrelevant, as consensus in the region is difficult to
 achieve)?
 A major issue that UNASUR and other Latin agencies will have to
 struggle with will be maintaining the organization's momentum to push
 forward for greater integration. Currently UNASUR is characterized by a
 wave of like-minded governments, most of them left-leaning with only
 Colombia's Alvaro Uribe and Peru's Alan Garcia standing as markedly
 Washington-friendly. As South America is striving to become a
 democratic region, new presidential elections will eventually take
 place which may bring to office a new series of presidents who may be
 less interested in supporting UNASUR's quest for autonomy and national
 fulfillment and more interested in reestablishing close ties with
 Washington's markets. For UNASUR to survive and expand, South American
 leaders must seize the moment in order to make certain that the
 organization is not downgraded when leaders like Brazil's Luiz Inacio
 Lula da Silva or Venezuela's Hugo Chavez leave office.
CSD Issues
 Questions that will have to be confronted if the CSD is to be a viable
 and relevant agency in regional military integration, with a potential
 for joint military operations include:
- What will its mandate be?
- Should it resemble NATO?
- Will there be a NATO-style article 5 promoting collective security?
- Where will its headquarters be located?
- Is it open to membership of Caribbean-basin states?
-  Where would the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
 (commonly known as the Rio Treaty, or TIAR) stand in relation to CSD's
 mandate?
- Will the U.S. be extended observer status?
- Will there be CSD-sponsored war games and joint-military exercises?
 Another issue that will have to be addressed is the current level of
 distrust that exists among several South American militaries, as well
 as their obsession (as a national obligation) to protect their
 countries' sovereignty. It would be difficult, for some to conceive
 that a Chilean colonel could take orders from a Peruvian General within
 a CSD chain of command. Venezuelans and Colombians may similarly have
 issues working with each other. One other factor is likely to be
 Brazil's predominating role in the body's day-to-day operations, giving
 the defining role played by Brasilia in the formation of UNASUR and the
 CSD.
Suggestions
 A number of suggestions are being put forward to increase the prospects
 of UNASUR and the CSD being successful. Ambassador White recalled that
 he was once asked by then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
 Assistant Secretary of State Bill Rogers how to make the Organization
 of American States into a successful agency. White went on to write a
 paper that was circulated in the State Department suggesting that the
 Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America become the U.S.
 ambassador to the OAS. The logic was that this would put a high ranking
 and relevant official in an influential position at the OAS. Latin
 American countries would then see the importance of approaching this
 high-ranking official and would put an end to their custom of sending
 two ambassadors to Washington (one as ambassador to the White House,
 who is usually an experienced diplomat, and one to the OAS, who usually
 is not) and just send one seasoned diplomat to preside over both posts.
 This would facilitate the bringing of experience and good ideas to the
 OAS which, in turn could go a long way to making it a more relevant
 organization. A similar case could be made for UNASUR – South American
 governments must visualize the organization's potential and not view it
 as some kind of "freezer" or "retirement home" for diplomatic personnel
 on the skid. Sending less than competent officials to make up UNASUR's
 bureaucracy and leadership would condemn the organization to mediocrity
 and eventual failure.
 Regarding the CSD, that body may be seen as a means by which to
 promote confidence building and the introduction of a rational use of
 the continent's security component. Given the current arms race being
 witnessed in the region, the CSD could be an essential institution to
 prevent potential crises from escalating. At the present, there remains
 distrust and occasional disputes between various South American
 countries, for example: Peru vs. Chile, Bolivia vs. Chile, Argentina
 vs. Chile, Venezuela vs. Colombia, Venezuela vs. Guyana, Venezuela vs.
 Brazil; as well as extra-regional issues like Brazil's leadership
 current role in the UN mission to Haiti, MINUSTAH. The CSD might find
 its hands full promoting confidence between these contentious
 countries, perhaps through joint military exercises and oversight of
 military purchases. In addition, the CSD could adopt the role of a
 peacekeeping monitor in some of the countries' disputed areas, such as
 the border between Peru and Ecuador, Peru and Chile, Venezuela and
 Guyana, etc. The CSD could also take a role in helping governments to
 combat drug trafficking and other organized crime by serving as a
 coordinating organization attempting to systematize the anti-drug and
 crime strategy.
Test Case: Bolivia
 During the recent ongoing internal crisis in Bolivia, as protests
 spread across the country's western and southern regions, UNASUR held
 an emergency summit in Chile on September 15, which was called into
 session by Chilean President Michelle Bachelet. The result of the
 summit was a declaration providing full backing to President Morales
 and calling for negotiations between all parties. Former Chilean
 Foreign Minister Juan Gabriel Valdes, who has distinguished himself in
 a number of roles, has been appointed as UNASUR's special envoy to
 Bolivia.
 Already UNASUR is drawing criticism from other regional
 organizations, including the OAS – which is headed by another Chilean,
 Juan Miguel Insulza. He declared that it was "completely wrong" that
 the OAS was excluded from dialogue aimed at solving the Bolivian
 crisis. Insulza also has declared that "UNASUR was born a few months
 ago, so we have to get used to discussing South American issues within
 the UNASUR, and not in the OAS." Indeed, trying to find a role will be
 one of UNASUR's major challenges in the foreseeable future as it will
 undoubtedly tread on the "turf" of other organizations like the OAS.
 Nevertheless, Bolivia is a test case for how successful, if at all,
 UNASUR will be. Should Valdes be even partially successful in bringing
 the relevant parties to halt the regional unrest and the deep divide
 that separates the various parts of the country, between rich and poor,
 people of European descent and indigenous, and industrialist and field
 works, this could go a long way toward giving the young organization
 credibility. In essence, Bolivia could be to UNASUR what Guatemala was
 to the OAS in 1954 – an opportunity to be relevant.
Hope, but not too much
 There is a growing optimism that UNASUR, without the U.S. as a member,
 could bring about more effective regional integration, a goal the OAS
 has largely failed to achieve in its 60 years of existence. A
 successful diplomatic intervention in Bolivia would greatly bolster
 UNASUR's prestige and sense of mission. However, ultimately it is the
 task of regional governments – namely powerhouse Brazil in this
 instance – to maintain momentum and demonstrate whether ambitious
 initiatives such as the CSD can become a reality, rather than just
 another unfulfilled promise, something which South America has been
 compelled to know a lot about.
This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sánchez




