Why did Abstention Win in Venezuela?

Monday, December 3, 2007

There were no surprises actually. Wishes alone do not come true. The
stark reality imposes constraints on unbridled illusions. The scenery
of a political defeat with a high abstention rate, even if it had
resulted in a pyrrhic election victory, places the strategic leadership
of the revolution in the only rational and emotional space necessary to
overcome the current situation: to recognise mistakes and correct them,
starting with the one sided view of the infallibility of the leader.

With an abstention of close to 7,200,000 voters (45%), and the
extremely narrow margin between the YES and NO (CNE has accounted for 4
million 504 thousand 354 votes (50.70%) in favour of NO, and 4 million
379 thousand 392 votes for the YES, which represents 49.29%), the
reading is that the worst-case scenario: a tie with a catastrophic high
abstention, was not only the most probable event but the actual one.

The opposition stayed in neutral gear in relation to December 2006
(in fact the united opposition failed to take off significantly in
2006), and the stark truth is that there was a runoff in the social
base of support of the revolution, a real evaporation of the Bolivarian
vote. Not only are there not 4,000,000 million oligarchs, but neither
are there 3,000,000 "abstentionist traitors ", former voters of the
revolution. The rejection of the reform is very high, no matter what
rationalisations are elaborated over a supposed a-political and
anti-political basis of the abstention. The revolutionary social base
signalled a political abstention towards the reform proposal. This is
the first sensible conclusion in the face of the electoral results.

Secondly, we must not give undue importance to the media campaign of
manipulation of fear launched by the supporters of the NO as an
explanation of the current situation. It played a role no doubt, but it
was not essential. It was predictable that the migration of the
Bolivarian vote would go not towards the NO, but towards abstention. In
fact, contrary to the propagandistic blackmail that wanted to convert
the referendum into a plebiscite, and bring the decision to the terrain
of loyalty, it evidenced a deep sense of protest in the Bolivarian
camp. To 3,000,000 Bolivarians, neither the way in which the
Constitutional Reform was handled, nor some core aspects of the draft
constitutional reform seemed appropriate, which, if it had been voted
thematically, would have resulted in a lower abstention.

The largest share of the responsibility for the defeat lies in those
who convinced Chavez that the revolution depends exclusively on his
personal figure. This is an error. Probably without Chavez there would
be no revolution, but only with Chavez neither. There is a need to
correct the tendency to minimise the leading role of the people in
times of important deliberations and decisions. The "Chavismo apparat"
(the leadership of PSUV, [United Socialist Party of Venezuela[) was
defeated. The revolution is built from the bottom up, or it wears down
from above. It is not a question of "it was not possible for now." I
will not tire of repeating this. The path chosen for the construction
of the political feasibility of the reform was wrong. The proposed
reform was very badly designed and handled. There were substantive
issues which go beyond a constitutional reform, which did not break
with the old bureaucratic socialism, and that now require a radical
debate. The minefield of the constitutional reform exploded in the
electoral field, and it did not make it possible to move forward. Even
its constitutional legality was severely questioned, despite attempts
by the Constitutional Chamber to iron out the wrinkles. The
mistreatment of disagreements has exacted a heavy toll on the vertical
style of doing politics. Decisions are not imposed, they should be
discussed.

There is no protagonic revolutionary democracy without deliberative
democracy, without internal democracy in the Bolivarian camp. I will
not repeat the errors contained within the text: Why is the minefield
of constitutional reform now exploding? Chavez persists in error if he
thinks that "3 million votes are missing" and that "these people did
not vote against us, they abstained”. They abstained because essential
aspects of form and contents of the draft reform, without any
modification, do not constitute a proposal for a democratic
counter-hegemonic project. Do not underestimate the people, nor its
intuition or capacity for political, intellectual and moral autonomy.

The struggle for socialism must go on, but a distinction needs to be
made between authoritarian hegemony and democratic counter-hegemony.
Unity in diversity is the viable path to a plural and libertarian
socialism. Any socialism that liquidates democratic pluralism, either
by word or by deed, will not pass the test of popular sovereignty. Not
only has the maximum degree of social equality to be achieved but of
political equality too. The Jacobin vision of revolutions directed from
above by vanguards and singular personalities has to be done away with.
It is time for profound reflection in the revolutionary leadership,
time to finish with both the pragmatism of the domestic right and the
Stalinism of the domestic ultra-left, time to end corruption and
bureaucratism, time to stop the drift towards ceasarist-populism and
time to renew critical socialist thought. It is also time to ask
forgiveness for the many abuses committed and to show some humility.

It is time to resolve a dilemma that is not an electoral one: either
we build a truly democratic socialism, led from the bottom up, from the
popular power, organised in its diversity and multiplicity, or we end
up compromising with the right and all those who want to take a
populist path without profound changes. There are four great defeated
here: the apparat bureaucracy, the domestic right and its cesarist
myth, the Stalinism and the authoritarian attitudes of the ego-politik
that exists, I hope temporarily, in Chavez. The aim is to construct a
socialism of the democratic majorities. Nothing more, nothing less. For
this, we must not radicalise the discourse; we must deepen and renew
socialist democratic and revolutionary practice, from the bottom up,
towards the construction of an autonomous, democratic and revolutionary
popular power.

Translated for Red Pepper by Roberto Navarrete