What Room for Maneuver Does María Corina Machado Have?

María Corina Machado has not made any public appearances for almost 40 days. After ambivalent statements about her “clandestinity,” she has been accused of preparing to leave the country. Machado insists she remains in Venezuela but has not provided any evidence. She affirms, as did Edmundo González when he was applying for asylum in Spain, that she will not leave the country.

Isolation and loss of traction

Machado’s appearances have been telematic from closed places. Occasionally, she is seen distraught, despite efforts to show confidence and forcefulness in her reasoning.

The hardline opposition’s latest “national mobilization,” scheduled for September 28, did away with the plan of mass gatherings and opted for the tactical resource of the “swarm.” The result was an atomized activity with little attendance or relevance. In other words, the organization of opposition mobilization collapsed and demonstrated its weakness.

On social media, where the “queen bee” has ruled due to being favored by algorithms, Machado has been increasingly criticized for a promise of “cashing out” (cobrar) that has translated into nothing.

The core of Machado’s political destiny lies precisely in that premise of “cashing out,” effectively triggering regime change, as she had incessantly promised. The mood changed drastically after Edmundo González requested asylum and fled to Spain. He communicated to Machado just one day before boarding a plane bound for Madrid.

There has been no institutional breakdown within Venezuela. After various calls from both politicians [Machado and González], no military or police authority has taken up arms, and no major element within the security sphere has mobilized in support of their agenda.

The big private economic actors organized in the main business associations have not actively participated in the postelectoral diatribe. They have made a few statements calling for “peace, stability, and work.” They do not participate in the diatribe and, therefore, have not played an open role in Machado’s insurrectional project.

Recently, the government set up a new dialogue initiative with Venezuelan opposition parties. The notable absence was that of the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) that supported Edmundo González. González, Machado, and the PUD published a statement in which they indicated that a real dialogue would only be possible if they participated and with the goal of Maduro giving up power to begin a “transition.”

The clearly defiant message demanded that Chavismo hand over power. Yet, that message resonates differently with the other opposition parties. Machado and González will once again repeat the strategy of abstentionism. They will pressure the parties not to take part in the upcoming elections. They will call them “scorpions” and will try to contain, by applying pressure, further ruptures in the already fragile image of the anti-Chavista consensus.

Obstacles and opposing forces

What are Machado’s real capabilities to materialize regime change? With what force is she capable of demanding that Maduro begin a purported transition?

The opposition leader lacks the basic tools that could lead to a coup. If we look at the internal picture, there is no high-impact street mobilization, no support from economic actors, and no institutional breakdown in the military. She also does not have the support of all the opposition, and is “in hiding.” That is, internally, there is no possibility of “cashing out” in sight.

The only real options for Venezuela’s extremist opposition are in the hands of factors outside the country.

Outside Venezuela, the US mercenary Erik Prince, alongside former Venezuelan military deserters, has raised funds to finance a new private coup. This would not be a novelty given the failed “Operation Gideon” of 2020 by Jordan Goudreau’s contractor, Silvercorp, with support from the DEA.

Now, various leaders of the “Ya Casi Venezuela” platform are accusing each other of fraud and individual profiteering from the funds raised. So far, the money raised seems to be insufficient for a mercenary mission on a significant scale in a place like Venezuela, which, in demographic terms, is the most militarily equipped country in the region.

It is very difficult to know the actual dimension of the organization belonging to Prince and his associates because the flow of information—real or false—is part of the game of shadows of intelligence and counterintelligence.

Meanwhile, the governments of the so-called “international community,” or rather, the United States and its allied countries, have taken a position not to recognize the re-election of President Nicolás Maduro. Yet thus far they remain reluctant to accept Edmundo González as “president-elect” in self-exile.

Machado, along with her allies and media operators, has launched a campaign to renew “maximum pressure” on Venezuela’s oil industry.

Venezuela has risen to third place among crude oil exporters to the United States. Meanwhile, military and geopolitical tensions in West Asia create a major obstacle for Washington, limiting its ability to apply more illegal sanctions or revoke Treasury licenses.

License 41-A (allowing Chevron to operate in Venezuela) was automatically extended for another six months without any statements from the US government on the matter.

Clearly, any calculation to effect a regime change, coup, or assassination in Venezuela lies in the external designs and actors, meaning that these options are not in Machado’s hands.

The far-right leader has probably exhausted all her resources and possibilities internally. Time and all elements of real power are not on her side.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Translated by Orinoco Tribune, minor edits by Venezuelanalysis.

Source: Misión Verdad