Voting Trends: Do They Favor Machado/González or Maduro?
In this article, for the first time to my knowledge, readers have access to the results of all national electoral results during the current Chavismo period,1998–2024. This information, compiled in the compact table “Venezuela: All National Electoral Results, 1998–2024,” includes all Presidential, Constituent, National Assembly voting, and various types of referendums. [See table at the end of the article.]
It is important to compare like with like, so the figures exclude local regional and municipal elections, which are separate processes. This analysis focuses on the controversial July 28, 2024, presidential election, comparing it with similar elections since 1998. In this context, Chavismo has won all but two elections, as shown by the grey shading in the table. Ironically, as discussed below, even this loss raises serious doubts about the “fraud” accusation.
Based on voting trends and the data presented in the table, is the U.S.-led “fraud” narrative credible? Or is the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE), Venezuela’s constitutionally established national electoral council, credible? It is one or the other, apart from the strictly and fully justifiable sovereign constitutionality of Venezuela’s official electoral bodies.
However, let us play devil’s advocate for the moment, leaving aside the legal authority of the Constitution, and try to answer the question “Do voting trends and related demographic factors favor the credibility of Machado/ González’s or Nicolás Maduro?”
Of the first five electoral results in the table, all types of voting are self-explanatory, except for the 1999 Constitutional Referendum, which requires some elaboration. One of Chávez’s main campaign promises was the need for a new constitution. Thus, the 1999 Constitutional Referendum consisted of two questions: “Do you convene a National Constituent Assembly with the purpose of transforming the State and creating a new legal system that allows the effective functioning of a social and participatory democracy?” and “Do you authorize the President of the Republic so that after hearing the opinion of the political, social and economic sectors, the Government Act establishes the bases of an electoral process in which the members of the Constituent Assembly will be elected?” These were overwhelmingly approved, as the table indicates.
The 2004 Recall Referendum, initiated by the opposition after obtaining the minimum number of signatures, asked, “Do you agree to revoke, for the current term, the popular mandate as President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela granted to citizen Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías through democratic and legitimate elections? NO or YES?” The NO vote won, defeating the opposition’s goal to revoke Chávez.
The 2007 Chávez-initiated Constitutional Referendum consisted of two blocks of questions related to 69 constitutional amendments, mainly concerning the elimination of term limits for presidential elections and a wide array of policies to benefit working people. It was narrowly defeated. The only other electoral setback for Chavismo was the 2015 National Assembly elections, dealt with below.
What do the voting trends tell us about the credibility of the opposing narratives regarding the results of the July 28 election? The opposition claims to have won by a landslide and to have carried all states, based on their own electoral calculations – made in Miami. On the other hand, Maduro accepts the official electoral results, which give him more than 6 million votes. Aside from the obvious geographic/political disparity between Miami and Caracas, a relatively simple exercise in number crunching can perhaps lead us to a conclusion.
First, the above-mentioned 2007 Constitutional Referendum was won by the opposition, which, of course, accepted the results. Despite this defeat, the Chavista forces conceded the unfavorable results. However, despite the loss, they still received an average of 4.36 million votes in both referendum questions, a result that was de facto accepted by the opposition. Of course, they did no cry “fraud” on that occasion. This 4.36 million Chavista data is relatively close to the 6 million votes in favor of Maduro in 2024, challenging the narrative of an overwhelming opposition victory across the country.
Furthermore, in 2007, the population was approximately 26 million, with around 16 million registered voters. Therefore, the 4.36 million Chavista votes were drawn from a smaller potential base compared with the current July 24 vote, with a population of nearly 29 million, of which about 21 million were registered voters. This comparison underscores the significance of the 2007 vote count relative to the 2024 result, narrowing the gap between the two elections (4.36 million versus 6 million). Thus, these figures also serve to cast doubt on the opposition’s claim of a landslide victory.
Second, in the 2015 National Assembly elections, which marked the only other Chavista defeat celebrated by the opposition, the Bolivarians still secured 5.62 million votes. This result is within the same range as the 6 million votes for Maduro in 2024, further discrediting the opposition’s wildly exaggerated claims. Although the population remained relatively stable between both elections, the Chavistas faced a disadvantage due to an increase in registered voters – from about 19.50 million in 2015 to about 21 million in 2024. Therefore, the 5.62 million votes garnered by Maduro’s supporters in 2015 are even more significant, once again countering the opposition’s narrative of an overwhelming victory.
The table shows a noticeable decline in popular vote for Maduro, dropping from 68% in the 2018 presidential elections to 52% in the recent July election. Does this suggest that Maduro’s popularity is waning and that he could not have possibly won the 2024 vote? Not necessarily.
To analyze this, it’s important to remember that the main opposition forces urged a boycott of the 2018 presidential election. This call for abstention was spearheaded by the principal opposition coalition, the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), and was largely effective, with only 46% voter turnout – the lowest ever for a presidential election in Venezuela (i.e., the competition for who will occupy Miraflores, the head of state offices).
However, this resulted in a Pyrrhic victory for the opposition, as the relatively low voter turnout worked in favor of Maduro, who won a record percentage of the popular vote that year. Thus, the anomaly in voting patterns between 2018 and 2024 is partly the fault of the main opposition party, which promoted abstention! Moreover, in 2018, Maduro won a number of actual votes (6.24 million) that falls within the general range of recent presidential elections.
The voting trend in support of Chavismo for head of state elections from this more recent period is as follows: 7.30 million (2006); 8.19 million (2012); 7.58 million (2013); and 6.40 million (2024).
During this period, the polls reflected similar outcomes for other national elections, aside from the presidential vote, as follows: the 2007 Constitutional Referendum, lost by Chavismo, garnered 4.36 million votes; the 2009 Constitutional Referendum received 6.31 million votes; the 2010 National Assembly elections resulted in 5.45 million votes; the 2015 National Assembly elections had 5.62 million votes; and the 2020 National Assembly elections saw 3.91 million votes.
Thus, the 6.40 million votes for Maduro’s Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) on July 28 is entirely plausible, while the insane claim of the fictitious U.S.-driven sweep is not at all convincing. On the contrary, the figures show that the only fraud consists of the opposition’s posturing. These figures are further proof that Maduro won. Thus, President Maduro and the Bolivarian Revolution deserve the support of the peoples of the world, as well as the governments, especially those in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.