Reconnaissance in Force Jason W. Smith, Ph.D. Normally reliable sources in Latin America tell me that what has been unfolding since I wrote the column “The Plot Unfolds” are the details of the (1) trouble-making strategy combined with a rather typical Gringo (2) Recon in Force. They have given me the following guidelines and I am passing them on to you and hopefully, DGIM ( (General Direction of Military Intelligence of Venezuela). (1) Infiltration of agents into FARC ranks to (a) kill specific targets and (b) win over (convert) other specific targets. This is a typical Gringo SEAL Team tactic I am told. They think it’s funny or cute to operate in this way and this is consistent with their childish view of the world and human relationships. Consider the kind of recruits we are dealing with here. This is done by making contact with a FARC person’s soft spots (relatives and friends who can be used as conduits or against whom threats can be made.) Then using the relative or friend’s established access, the agent is infiltrated. (2) Now there isn’t much we can do to help the Colombians but in Venezuela the government should consider closing all those “Roach Motels” the Gringo Embassy set up called Coffee Corners or some such thing. –And every other Gringo Embassy outlet of a similar nature. I realize that leaving them open has allowed early detection of the traitors who would frequent such places but given the stepped assault of the USA on Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, etc., the time may have come to shut these down and the right wing student operations. (3) In military operations reconnaissance of enemy front lines is sometimes done by units strong enough to punch against those lines fairly hard (as opposed to just determining the location of troops and firing points.) If by chance the recon force should punch a hole in the line a back-up force is ready to push through all the way. We believe that is what is going on here with various recon probes against Venezuela in the air, on the ground, and from the sea, underway with reserves to be used against Venezuela gathered on San Andres Island. But, gathering at different points not to far away is the key thing. Countering this attempt to use recon-in-force to exploit openings that may come about as a result of small unit actions such as those currently underway against FARC of all sizes and types. Sharp destructive blows against such Recon forces either in operation or afterwards are often effective in discouraging the use of these tactics.