Venezuela: Between the Christmas Frenzy and the Upcoming Presidential Inauguration

According to the global media apparatus, Venezuela is experiencing a very tense end of the year: we are on the verge of a confrontation centered around January 10, 2025. This is the date established by the National Constitution for the inauguration of the president-elect, who will govern until January 2031.

However, those who come into the country with the expectations of imminent conflict are greeted with a completely different scene: people focused on celebrating Christmas, bustling commercial activity, and minimal political tension.

Amidst this festive atmosphere, the government, the ruling party, security forces, and the Bolivarian National Armed Forces are engaged in intensive preventive activities, planning actions and mobilizations for the date when re-elected President Nicolás Maduro Moros is set to take the oath before the National Assembly. This unicameral parliament is largely dominated by Chavista political organizations, with the presence of moderate opposition factions that reject the plans of the radical wing.

Extremist opposition groups outside the country are attempting to create a climate of uncertainty and agitation. They applaud the new unilateral coercive measures imposed by the United States on Venezuelan officials and pin their hopes on Donald Trump’s return to power, as he is set to take office after Maduro.

These are the specificities of a country where political analysts often get it very wrong, either because they don’t understand Venezuelan idiosyncrasies or because they project personal aspirations for how events might unfold.

An intense year

2024 has been another politically intense year in Venezuela. It couldn’t be otherwise, since presidential elections took place in July. For the first time since 2013, the main opposition coalition united around a single candidate capable of rallying large numbers of voters dissatisfied with the Bolivarian Revolution.

The elections demonstrated that a significant portion of the electorate is willing to vote literally for anyone as long as they aim to oust Chavismo, which is nearing its 26th year in power. The evidence is compelling: the opposition candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, was an absolute unknown to most of the country – a career diplomat with no prior political leadership, no experience in elected office, and little charisma. Despite these attributes, along with his advanced age and lack of appeal, he managed to secure 45% of the vote as announced by the National Electoral Council (CNE) and later ratified by the Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ).

The presidential election became as polarized as in the early years of Chavismo, with victories for Hugo Chávez Frías (1998, 2000, 2006, and 2012) and Nicolás Maduro’s first win (2013). The remaining eight opposition candidates garnered negligible support.

Fraud claims

The July elections repeated a familiar pattern from past processes: opposition leaders claimed to be victims of fraud and rejected the results without providing evidence for such serious accusations.

Despite the lack of proof, the fraud narrative gained support from imperial powers, their allies, and the hegemonic media, which now assert that the country is on the brink of civil war.

The opposition, united under the Democratic Unity Platform, did not present its allegations of fraud to the CNE, as required by law. Nor did it appear before the Supreme Court’s Electoral Chamber when that body, at President Maduro’s request, reviewed the election results. Instead, the strategy has followed the same old libretto: appealing to the “international community” (i.e., the US and its allies) to validate the alleged outcome favoring González Urrutia.

After the CNE first announced the results, violent protests broke out on July 29 and 30. Unlike previous episodes (2013, 2014, 2017), the state responded swiftly and decisively this time. Over 2,300 people were detained and subjected to judicial proceedings by the Attorney General’s Office and the courts.

This year, extremist leaders failed to turn the violence into an opportunity to accuse the government of crimes against humanity. On the contrary, most of the 28 fatalities during those two days were Chavista activists or bystanders uninvolved in the clashes. The perpetrators were members of cells referred to as “comanditos” [small comandos] by the radical faction’s leader, María Corina Machado.

The disturbances were swiftly quelled, leaving the opposition with no choice but to claim that the detainees were “political prisoners,” this time adding allegations that the government had detained minors for political reasons. Global media amplified claims that children were tortured and subjected to cruel treatment. The government and Attorney General denied these allegations, stating that only individuals aged 14 and older can be prosecuted in Venezuela. Minors between 14 and 18 were handled by special justice systems under the Organic Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents. Many were accused of serious crimes, such as the gruesome murder of communal leaders, intimidation, injuries, and destruction of public and private property.

Most protestors were either incentivized with payments in dollars by political leaders, swept up in the excitement of street violence, or part of criminal and paramilitary gangs collaborating with the far-right in recent years.

As of late December, over 300 detainees have been released, some unconditionally and others under periodic court supervision. President Maduro has expressed support for carefully reviewing cases to free innocent individuals or those involved in minor offenses. However, he ruled out a general amnesty, stating, “there will be general justice, not general amnesty.”

The international context

Radical opposition groups are fueling expectations for January 10, claiming that González Urrutia will be sworn in that day, marking the end of Chavismo.

However, extremist rhetoric has alerted national authorities, the ruling PSUV party, and the Bolivarian Armed Forces. The alert is on not due to the internal opposition’s capacity to destabilize but because external military and paramilitary activities potentially linked to insurrectional plans have been detected.

The cozy relationship between Guyana’s government and the US Southern Command, along with Washington’s military agreements with Trinidad and Tobago, adds to the wide-reaching network of US bases in Colombia, Aruba, Curaçao, and Panamá, creating a heavily armed environment surrounding Venezuela.

As 2024 ends, the endless cycle of expectation and frustration within the Venezuelan opposition persists – a quarter-century-long pattern of hoping for the defeat or fall of the Chavista government, only to face the disappointment of failure.

When Venezuelans raise their glasses on New Year’s Eve, many will be thinking of January 10. Some will hope for the miracle of González Urrutia’s inauguration; others will wish for the peaceful renewal of Maduro’s mandate. Until that day arrives, shopping malls, restaurants, beaches, and baseball stadiums will remain packed as people from both sides celebrate with traditional foods, plentiful drinks, and music. Such is Venezuela, even in its darkest times – why would these days be any different?

Clodovaldo Hernández is a journalist and political analyst with experience in higher education. He won the National Journalism Prize (Opinion category) in 2002. He is the author of the books Reinventario (poetry and short stories) De genios y de figuras (journalistic profiles) and Esa larga, infinita distancia (novel).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Translated by Venezuelanalysis.